OSP related literature

This page collates theoretical work related to obvious strategy-proofness. It is not comprehensive.

1. Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof, Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, JET 2019

2. On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness, Arribillaga, Masso, and Neme, JET 2020

3. All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof, Arribillaga, Masso, and Neme, working paper 2019

4. Gibbard-Satterthwaite success stories and obvious strategy-proofness, Bade and Gonczarowski, EC 2017

5. Matching with single-peaked preferences, Bade, JET 2019

6. Pick-an-object mechanisms, Bó and Hakimov, working paper 2020

7. A revelation principle for obvious strategy-proofness, Mackenzie, working paper 2019

8. A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design, Pycia and Troyan, working paper 2019

9. Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles, Troyan, International Economic Review 2019

10. Obvious manipulations, Troyan and Morrill, JET 2019

11. Obvious belief elicitation, Tsakas, GEB 2019

12. Bounded rationality and robust mechanism design: an axiomatic approach, Zhang and Levin, AER P&P 2017