OSP related literature

This page collates theoretical work related to obvious strategy-proofness. It is not comprehensive.

1. Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof, Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, JET 2019

2. On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness, Arribillaga, Masso, and Neme, JET 2020

3. All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof, Arribillaga, Masso, and Neme, 2019

4. Gibbard-Satterthwaite success stories and obvious strategy-proofness, Bade and Gonczarowski, EC 2017

5. Matching with single-peaked preferences, Bade, JET 2019

6. Pick-an-object mechanisms, Bó and Hakimov, 2020

7. A revelation principle for obvious strategy-proofness, Mackenzie, GEB 2020

8. A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design, Pycia and Troyan, 2019

9. Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles, Troyan, International Economic Review 2019

10. Obvious manipulations, Troyan and Morrill, JET 2019

11. Obvious belief elicitation, Tsakas, GEB 2019

12. Bounded rationality and robust mechanism design: an axiomatic approach, Zhang and Levin, AER P&P 2017

13. Twofold conservatism in choice under uncertainty, Echenique, Pomatto, and Vinson 2021

14. An axiomatic approach to failures in contingent reasoning, Miyashita and Nakamura 2020

15. Classification of Priorities such that deferred acceptance is obviously strategy-proof, Thomas 2021

16. Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms for machine scheduling, Diodato et al ESA 2019

17. Obvious strategy-proofness, bounded rationality, and approximation, Ferraioli and Ventre SAGT 2019