PhD in Economics, Stanford University.
Junior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows.

I work on economic theory and behavioral economics, with a particular interest in market design.  Lately, I've been thinking about how to design economic systems that are simple and transparent, even when they deal with complex underlying constraints.

Working Papers

Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (resubmitted, American Economic Review)
The online appendix is available here.

Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets (resubmitted, Journal of Political Economy)
(with Mohammad Akbarpour and Shayan Oveis-Gharan) 
Here are some videos that exposit the paper.

Ethics and Market Design (revise and resubmit, Oxford Review of Economic Policy)

Belief Updating and the Demand for Information (resubmitted, Games and Economic Behavior)
(with Sandro Ambuehl)

(with Ning Yu)

Published Papers

Obvious Ex Post Equilibrium (Papers and Proceedings of the AER, 2017) (published version)
The online appendix is available here.

Work in Progress

Credible Mechanism Design (with Mohammad Akbarpour)