I study economic theory and behavioral economics, with a particular focus on the design of market institutions.
I gave a presentation on credible auctions at the Simons Institute, which was recorded on video.
Credible Auctions: A Trilemma is now conditionally accepted at Econometrica.
Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets is accepted at the Journal of Political Economy.
Credible Auctions: A Trilemma (with Mohammad Akbarpour)
- Conditionally accepted, Econometrica
- EC'18 SIGecom Best Paper Award
Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets (with Mohammad Akbarpour and Shayan Oveis-Gharan)
- Accepted, Journal of Political Economy
- Here are short videos that exposit the paper:
Context-Dependent Choice as Explained by Foraging Theory (with Ning Yu)
Belief Updating and the Demand for Information (with Sandro Ambuehl)
- American Economic Review, 2017, lead article
- Online Appendix Presentation Slides
- Corrigendum for Theorem 3
- Aliprantis Prize 2017, Exeter Prize 2018
- Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Review, 2017